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1. Introduction 
 
The marketing and internationalisation of sporting activities alongside ongoing European 
integration has put the relationship between the European Union and the sports world under 
strain. The Bosman case marked the start of an intense debate on an appropriate regulatory 
framework for this evolving relationship.
1
 Still, the fact that a sporting context does not hinder 
the application of EC law forms part of the settled case law of the Court of Justice in the 
sphere of free movement. While the European Commission and several Advocates General 
have already regularly dealt with the application of EC competition rules to sport,
2
 the Court 
of Justice recently tackled this issue, with the Meca-Medina & Majcen judgment as the most 
prominent example.
3
 In Meca-Medina & Majcen, the Court unequivocally stated that a 
sporting activity cannot automatically be excluded from the scope of EC competition law 
without first determining whether the rules governing that activity emanate from an 
undertaking, whether the latter restricts competition or abuses its dominant position, and 
whether that restriction or abuse affects trade between Member States.
4
 Although the Court in 
Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v. Elliniko Dimosio (“MOTOE”) refers 
only briefly to the Meca-Medina & Majcen ruling – which was rendered by the Third 
Chamber –, the present case can be seen as an implicit endorsement of the latter. The fact that 
the Grand Chamber handled the MOTOE case underlines the importance of this approval, and 
the relationship between sport and EC (competition) law in general. Concurrently, this case 
presented an excellent opportunity to the Court to clarify the criteria guiding the application 
of EC competition law to sport.  
 
2. Factual background 
 
MOTOE is a non-profit-making motor sports association having the objective of organizing 
motorcycling events in Greece. In accordance with the Greek Road Traffic Code (Article 49), 
MOTOE‟s application for authorization to organize such competitions was forwarded by the 
competent minister to the Automobile and Touring Club of Greece (ELPA), a non-profit-
making association representing the International Motorcycling Federation, so that it could 
give the consent required for authorization. Alongside its participation in the Greek State‟s 
authorization process, ELPA is involved in the organization of motor sports competitions. For 
this purpose, ELPA had created a National Motorcycle-Racing Committee (ETHAM) to 
which it entrusted the supervizion and organization of motorcycling events.  
When MOTOE‟s application was tacitly rejected because the necessary consent by 
ELPA/ETHAM was not given, MOTOE appealed and questioned the dual role of ELPA. 
MOTOE submitted that Article 49 of the Greek Road Traffic Code was contrary, first, to the 
constitutional principle that administrative bodies must be impartial and, second, to Articles 
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82 and 86(1) EC because it enabled ELPA to impose a monopoly on the organization of 
motorcycling competitions and to abuse that position. The referring Greek Court observed 
that ELPA‟s activities are not limited purely to sporting matters since it is involved in 
sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts in the context of the organization of its own 
motorcycling events. Two more observations related to the absence of effective remedy under 
Greek law for applicants whose application has been rejected and the fact that ELPA‟s role in 
the authorization process is not subject to control or appraisal. Against this background, two 
preliminary questions were referred to the European Court of Justice. First, the referring Court 
raised the question of whether the activities of a non-profit-making association such as ELPA 
fall within the scope of Articles 82 and 86(1) EC. Should the answer be in the affirmative, the 
Greek Court wanted to ascertain whether a rule such as laid down in the Greek Road Traffic 
Code, is compatible with these Treaty provisions.
5
   
 
3. Opinion of the Advocate General 
 
Advocate General Kokott commenced her opinion by emphasising that both the political level 
and the Community Courts recognised more than once that sport is not generally excluded 
from the scope of EC law.
6
 In her analysis of the first question, the Advocate General paid 
great attention to the concept of undertaking in Community competition law and its 
application in a sporting context. According to Advocate General Kokott, ELPA has the status 
of an undertaking because its activities are economic in nature in two ways.
7
 First, in relation 
to the organization of motorcycling events, reference can be made to the fact that ELPA‟s 
services in this connection are requested and paid for by the participants or their clubs. 
Second, as regards the marketing of these events, the Advocate General specified that ELPA‟s 
services are used by sponsors, advertising partners and insurers and that these events can also 
be marketed through ticket sales or the sale of television broadcasting rights. The fact that 
ELPA is a non-profit-making organization, that its services relate to sport, or the fact that 
ELPA participates in the State‟s authorization process of motorcycling events does not alter 
the qualification as an undertaking.
8
 
Further on, the Advocate General examined whether ELPA holds a dominant position 
on the market and whether trade between Member States could possibly be affected. In doing 
so, she identified two separate relevant product markets: the organization and the marketing 
of (motor)sports events.
9
 Concerning the relevant geographic market, she recalled that the 
territory of a Member State, as in casu Greece, can be regarded as a substantial part of the 
common market.
10
 According to Advocate General Kokott it can be assumed that ELPA holds 
a dominant position on these markets if ELPA were responsible for the organization of all or 
at least the vast majority of all motorcycling events in Greece. Although the Advocate 
General left it to the referring court to make the necessary factual findings in this respect, she 
started from this assumption in order to ascertain the (potential) effect on trade between 
Member States.
11
 Even if the Advocate General left the final appreciation to the national 
court, she highlighted several indications of an appreciable effect on trade between Member 
States. She referred to the international context of sport activities and the fact that the specific 
situation of ELPA enables it to prevent other organizers from entering the Greek market.
12
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Likewise, the fact that ELPA‟s association rules provide that commercial advertising at 
motorcycling events require prior consent from ELPA or ETHAM, might discourage foreign 
organizers, sponsors, advertising partners and insurance undertakings from engaging in the 
Greek motorsport business.
13
 The Advocate General countered the Greek Government‟s 
argument that the possible effects of any anti-competitive behaviour by ELPA on trade 
between Member States are totally insignificant because only a small number of motorcycling 
events with international participation are organized in Greece, both from a quantitative and a 
qualitative point of view. Quantitatively, obstructing the organization or marketing of only 
one or a few additional motorcycling events might impede the development of a larger 
market. In qualitative terms, the mere existence of a dominant market position extending over 
the entire territory of a Member State, may have the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of 
markets on a national basis whereby any abuse of ELPA‟s specific situation might contravene 
the objectives of the single market. 
In her analysis of the second question, Advocate General Kokott stipulated that not 
every exercise of ELPA‟s right of co-decision in the State‟s authorization process can 
automatically be considered as an abuse of its dominant position.
14
 She referred to objective 
reasons, such as safety concerns, the need for uniform rules and an overarching structure, why 
the authorization of motorcycling events can be refused.
15
 However, the Advocate General 
came to the conclusion that the Greek legislation at stake violates Articles 86(1) and 82 EC 
because it creates a risk of abuse.
16
 The risk that ELPA will abuse its dominant position in 
exercising its right of consent is particularly high because the Greek authorization process 
leads to a conflict of interest but also because ELPA‟s role in it is not subject to any 
restrictions, obligations or controls.
17
     
 
4. Judgment of the Court 
 
The Court of Justice confirmed the findings of Advocate General Kokott. Even if the Court 
considered both questions together, to a great extent it followed the same reasoning as the 
Advocate General. The Court classified ELPA as an undertaking and gave some guidance to 
the national judge to assess whether ELPA holds a dominant position. In doing so, the Court, 
unlike the Advocate General, did not explicitly identify two separate relevant product markets 
but referred to “two types of activities [that] are not interchangeable but are rather 
functionally complementary”.18 In answer to the concrete question of whether the Greek 
legislation infringes Articles 86(1) and 82 EC the Court recalled that “the mere creation or 
reinforcement of special or exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 86(1) EC is not in 
itself incompatible with Article 82 EC” and that “it is not necessary that any abuse should 
actually occur”.19 Thereupon, the Court stated that a Member State violates these Treaty 
provisions when it confers special or exclusive rights which give rise “to a risk of an abuse of 
a dominant position”.20 According to the Court, ELPA was placed at “an obvious advantage 
over its competitors”.21 This situation was accentuated by the fact that no consent is required 
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for the authorization of ELPA‟s events and the lack of any restrictions, obligations or review 
of ELPA‟s role in the authorization process.22        
 
5. Comment 
 
5.1. The application of EC competition rules to sport - introductory comments 
 
As Advocate General Kokott pointed out correctly, the understanding that sport is not by and 
large excluded from EC law is an important starting point for evaluating this case. In line with 
the Meca-Medina & Majcen judgment, the Court and the Advocate General structured their 
analysis along the three central elements of a traditional examination of Article 82 (together 
with Article 86(1)) EC – the concepts of undertaking, abuse of dominant position and effect 
on trade between Member States –, rather than holding any discourse on the specific features 
of sport and whether or not EC law applies. In addition, they tackled the question of whether 
the contested Greek legislation and the dual role of ELPA could be covered by the exceptions 
in Article 86(2) EC.   
 
5.2. Sporting bodies as undertakings or associations of undertakings 
 
Both the Advocate General and the Court consider whether the Greek motor sports 
association can be qualified as an undertaking with great care. As the concept of undertaking 
entails the first key element to assess whether EC competition law is applicable, this particular 
attention seems logical. However, it must be noted that this is not the first occasion where a 
sporting body has been held to be an undertaking or an association of undertakings for the 
purposes of these rules. Moreover, because the term undertaking was given a broad and a 
functional interpretation in the Court‟s case law,23 it seems evident that sporting bodies can be 
caught,
24
 especially when one takes into account the growing economic dimension of this 
sector. Already in 1992, in the case on the distribution of package tours during the 1990 
World Cup, the Commission held that FIFA, the Italian football federation and the local 
organizing committee, carried on activities of an economic nature and consequently 
constituted undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC.
25
 This was confirmed in 
several sporting cases. Regarding (football) clubs, the Commission confirmed this  inter alia  
in ENIC because through their team the clubs supply “sporting entertainment by playing 
matches against other clubs, usually in the context of a championship. These events are made 
available against payment (admission fees and/or radio and television broadcasting rights, 
sponsorship, advertising, merchandising, etc.) on several markets”.26 This viewpoint was 
confirmed in the Piau case.
27
 National sporting associations can be both undertakings and 
associations of undertakings. When these associations carry out economic activities 
themselves, for instance by selling broadcasting rights or by the commercial exploitation of a 
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sport event, they are to be considered as undertakings.
28
 In Piau, the Court of First Instance 
considered that the national football associations – “groupings of football clubs for which the 
practice of football is an economic activity” – constitute associations of undertakings.29 The 
fact that these associations group both amateur and professional clubs does not alter this 
qualification.
30
 In addition, international sporting associations can be both undertakings and 
associations of undertakings.
31
 In the present case, the Advocate General and the Court focus 
rightly on the economic dimension of ELPA‟s activities in order to qualify ELPA as an 
undertaking.       
 
5.3. Abuse of a dominant position in a sporting context 
 
A second key question to address when analysing the applicability of Article 82 (together 
with Article 86) EC is whether the concrete undertaking holds a dominant position on the 
market and if so, whether it abuses that position. To that end, the relevant market(s), both 
from the point of view of the goods or services concerned and from the geographic point of 
view, must be defined first before the existence of a dominant position can be examined. 
 
5.3.1. Relevant market 
 
So far, the definition of the relevant market(s) received little attention in a sporting context. 
Regarding the relevant product (or service) market, a helpful indication was given by 
Advocate General Stix-Hackl writing extra-judicially in the Balog case.
32
 When scrutinising 
the transfer rules, she indicated that there were three interconnected markets.
33
 The first is the 
exploitation market where both clubs and associations act as undertakings and exploit their 
performances, by selling broadcasting rights for example. The second market is the contest 
market, “in which the typical product of professional sport is produced: the sporting 
contest”.34 The third market is the supply market where the clubs “sell” and “buy” players.35 
Although this analysis focused on the transfer rules in football, it seems that for the most part 
it can be transposed to other major (team) sports. Both in Meca-Medina & Majcen and in 
Piau, the Community judges did not elaborate on this. In Meca-Medina & Majcen, one might 
suggest that the contest market was at stake, although this was not explicitly stated. In Piau, 
the Court of First Instance mentioned that the rules in question affected the “market for the 
provision of services where the buyers are players and clubs and the sellers are agents”.36 
Unfortunately, the Court did not grasp the present case to elaborate the concept of relevant 
product (or service) market in a sporting context. The Court indeed reiterates its settled case 
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law
37
 and thus indicates that the fact that sport has some particular features that might 
distinguish it from other economic sectors, does not mean that there cannot be a market. 
However, the Court refrains from explicitly identifying one or more concrete relevant product 
(or service) markets. Instead, the Court concisely refers to the two activities of ELPA: the 
organization and the commercial exploitation of motorcycling events, which it defines as “not 
interchangeable but […] rather functionally complementary”.38 Whereas the Court clearly 
acknowledges that both activities are not identical, it seems hesitant to make a clear 
separation. It remains somewhat unclear why the Court prefers this rather blurred description 
to the finding of two separate relevant markets, as put forward by the Advocate General.
39
 
Admittedly, the commercial exploitation of sporting events is often related to the organization 
of it, but there is not necessarily a connection between both. This is not to say that the 
qualification that the activities are functionally complementary should be taken for the 
contention that there is only one market. It rather refers to the point that one market might 
have an influence on the other which is important in the analysis of dominance and of abuse. 
Regarding the relevant geographic market, both the Court and the Advocate General aptly 
refer to settled case law to affirm that the fact that while ELPA‟s activities are confined to 
Greece – so that the territory of one Member State constitutes the geographically relevant 
market – this does not hinder the appreciation of whether ELPA is active on a substantial part 
of the common market.
40
        
 
5.3.2. Abuse of dominant position versus the ‘practical monopoly position’ of sporting 
federations 
 
5.3.2.1. The ‘practical monopoly position’ of sporting federations 
 
According to the Court, the concept of a dominant position under Article 82 EC “[…] 
concerns a position of economic strength held by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent 
effective competition from being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and, 
ultimately, consumers”.41 Moreover, “[…] an undertaking can be put in such a position when 
it is granted special or exclusive rights enabling it to determine whether and, as the case may 
be, in what conditions, other undertakings may have access to the relevant market and engage 
in their activities on that market”.42 It should be noted that most sporting federations in 
Europe have a monopoly in their sport and can be considered dominant in the market of the 
organization of sporting activities for their particular sport. In practice, the European 
institutions have no major problems with this „practical monopoly position‟. This was plainly 
illustrated by the 2000 Nice Declaration on sport, where the European Council declared that  
“7. […] It recognises that, with due regard for national and Community legislation and on the basis of 
a democratic and transparent method of operation, it is the task of sporting organizations to organize 
and promote their particular sports […]. […] 9. These social functions entail special responsibilities 
for federations and provide the basis for the recognition of their competence in organizing 
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competitions. 10. While taking account of developments in the world of sport, federations must 
continue to be the key feature of a form of organization providing a guarantee of sporting cohesion and 
participatory democracy”.43  
On the one hand, this is a clear recognition of the central role of sporting federations in the 
organization of their sport. On the other hand, this recognition is not unconditional. The 
sporting federations need to take into account national and European law and need to function 
in a democratic and transparent way whereby they can play a key role but are not endowed 
with an absolute monopoly position. The judgment in MOTOE does not alter this fundamental 
point of view because it only questions the concrete dual role of ELPA under the concrete 
circumstances and not the role of sporting federations in general.
44
   
On the whole, ascertaining abuse of a dominant position is not evident in a sporting 
context.  A rare example concerns the discriminatory arrangements relating to the sale of 
entry tickets for the 1998 World Cup in France, where the Commission ruled that the French 
organizing committee had infringed Article 82 EC.
45
 Where regulation and organization 
vested in a single body leads to significant commercial conflicts of interest, Article 82 EC 
comes more clearly to the fore.
46
 Thus, in the FIA case the Fédération Internationale 
d‟Automobile was alleged to have abused its power by putting unnecessary (commercial) 
restrictions on promotors, circuit owners, vehicle manufacturers and drivers.
47
 The 
Commission closed the file after the parties involved agreed to make some changes, the most 
prominent change being the limitation of FIA‟s future role to that of a sports regulator having 
no commercial interests in Formula One.
48
 As the facts in MOTOE are not unsimilar to the 
FIA case, one might wonder whether the MOTOE judgment is a further endorsement of the 
requirement that regulatory and commercial power be strictly separated within the world of 
sport.  
The answer is not straightforward. Whereas the Advocate General observes that “[…] 
the maintenance of effective competition and the ensuring of transparency require a clear 
separation between the entity that participates in the authorization by a public body of 
motorcycling events and, when appropriate, monitors them, on the one hand, and the 
undertakings that organize and market such events, on the other”, the Court limits its findings 
to the peculiarities of this case. This does not give sporting federations a blank check. A 
general separation between all regulatory and commercial power in all circumstances might 
be excessive but at least two lessons may be drawn from the judgment in MOTOE. First, the 
case clearly confirms the willingness of the Court in Meca-Medina & Majcen to scrutinize 
sporting activities on their compliance with EC (competition) law. Second, where a sporting 
federation holds an exclusive right to designate the entities authorised to organize sporting 
events and to set the conditions under which these events are organized, this power should be 
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subject to “restrictions, obligations and review”.49 This seems valid even if this right has not 
been conferred by the government.  
 
5.3.2.2. Articles 82 and 86(1) EC and the concept of ‘conflict of interest’ 
 
Article 86(1) EC is infringed only in conjunction with another provision of the Treaty. In 
practice, it applies together with provisions that are addressed to Member States, such as the 
rules on free movement, and with the EC competition provisions that are addressed to 
undertakings.
50
 The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice regarding the application of Article 
86(1) EC in conjunction with Article 82 EC, and more precisely the link between the State 
measure and the breach of Article 82 EC by the undertaking, has been subject to strong 
variations.
51
  
In assessing the concrete breach of Articles 82 and 86 EC, the Court in MOTOE 
applies a severe interpretation of the concept of abuse.
52
 According to the Court, a Member 
State will infringe these provisions not only when the undertaking in question, merely by 
exercising the special or exclusive rights conferred upon it, is led to abuse its dominant 
position but also when the conferral of special or exclusive rights gives rise to a risk of an 
abuse of a dominant position.
53
 Despite this broad definition, the Court seems not to diverge 
from its former case law.
54
 The notion of “conflict of interest” is essential in this connection.55 
State measures that bundle regulatory functions and commercial activities can create a 
conflict of interest and are therefore contrary to Article 86 EC.
56
 The Court in MOTOE does 
not explicitly mention the concept of “conflict of interest” but was clearly inspired by the 
analysis of the Advocate General on this point. Advocate General Kokott observed that ELPA 
not only has the legal means to prevent other service providers from entering the Greek 
market, “[…] but also an economic interest in limiting access to the market by its competitors 
to its own advantage”.57 In this context, she referred to the Raso case, where the Court did 
mention a conflict of interest and stipulated that a national law did not merely grant a dock-
work company the exclusive right to supply temporary labour to terminal concessionaires and 
to other undertakings authorized to operate in the port but also enabled it to compete with 
them on the market in dock services; […] by merely exercising its monopoly it will be able  
“[…] to distort in its favour the equal conditions of competition between the various operators on the 
market in dock-work services and it is led to abuse its monopoly by imposing on its competitors in the 
dock-work market unduly high costs for the supply of labour or by supplying them with labour less 
suited to the work to be done”.58  
Whereas the Court in MOTOE does not mention the Raso case, it does refer to cases, such as 
ERT and GB Inno BM,
59
 that have been qualified in legal doctrine as an application of the 
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“conflict of interest” concept.60 In this respect, the Court emphasised that equality of 
opportunity between the various economic operators is essential to guarantee a system of 
undistorted competition.
61
 Interestingly, the Court also made reference to France v. 
Commission, where the Court assumed an infringement of Article 28 EC.
62
 
In a broader sporting context, the FIA case, where the Commission found a “conflict 
of interest” in that FIA used its regulatory powers to block the organization of races that 
competed with the events promoted or organized by FIA,
63
 is a further example of the fact 
that the combination of regulatory and commercial power within the world of sport might be 
disputable under EC competition law. However, by insisting on the need for “restrictions, 
obligations or controls/review”, both the Advocate General and the Court seem to suggest that 
sporting federations can „escape‟ when they apply objective and non-discriminatory criteria, 
provided their decision-making is transparent and their decisions open for review.                     
 
5.4. Effect on Trade between Member States in a sporting context 
 
A last element that needs to be considered when analysing the applicability of EC competition 
law concerns the effect of the rule or practice in question on trade between Member States. 
Again, this aspect has received little attention in sport related cases to date. However, the 
broad definition of this concept – a direct or indirect, actual or potential, influence on the 
pattern of trade between Member States suffices
64
 – seems to pose little problem in the case of 
sport, a sector that is becoming increasingly international. In the present case, the Court 
confirmed that limiting the marketing of products to a single Member State is not sufficient to 
preclude the possibility that trade between Member States might be affected.
65
 Such conduct 
might have the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a national basis, thereby 
upholding economic interpenetration.
66
    
 
5.5. No services of general economic interest 
 
In their search to escape from the application of EC (competition) law, sporting federations 
might find a way out in Article 86(2) EC which provides an exception to the competition rules 
for the proportionate pursuit of legitimate public interest goals by undertakings.
67
 Whereas 
this possibility has never been put forward in a concrete case so far and whereas it seems 
rather unlikely that Member States would be willing to take legal action to entrust sporting 
organizations with these tasks or that sporting federations would be favourable to such a 
development,
68
 it cannot be excluded that, at least in theory, the organization and marketing of 
sporting events can constitute a service of general economic interest. This can also be deduced 
from the Advocate‟s General statement that “[…] the question whether [the organization and 
marketing of motorcycling events by an association such as ELPA] constitute a service of 
general economic interest within the meaning of Article 86(2) EC, as the social significance 
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of sport might perhaps suggest, can be left unanswered”. In fact, both the Court and the 
Advocate General leave the hypothetical question on the possibilities of this provision in 
relation to sport unanswered as they conclude that Article 86(2) EC is not applicable. 
Therefore, they make a distinction between the organization and exploitation of the 
motorcycling events – tasks which were not entrusted to ELPA through an act of public 
authority – and the power of consent in the authorization procedure – which stems from an act 
of public authority but lacks economic activity.
69
 For the sake of completeness, Advocate 
General Kokott rightly observes that it is not clear how the preferential right conferred on 
ELPA is necessary in order for it to organize and market motorcycling events nor how the 
authorization procedure and the restrictions that go with it could be proportionate.
70
        
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The MOTOE judgment confirms that sport as an economic activity is subject to EC law. 
Concurrently, it confirms that a sporting context does not hinder the application of EC 
competition rules. On the basis of a traditional analysis of Articles 82 and 86 EC, the concrete 
finding that the Greek authorization process and the dual role of ELPA are contrary to EC law 
seems wholly correct. Somewhat remarkably, the Court, and to a lesser extent the Advocate 
General, barely mention the role of sporting federations, let alone the broader discussion on 
the relationship between sport and EC law, in their analysis. However, the fact that the Court 
vigorously restricts its findings to this case and seems even reluctant to elaborate on the role 
of sporting bodies, is not totally incomprehensible. Three elements can be mentioned in this 
respect. First, it was not necessary to incorporate these aspects in order to provide the national 
judge with an answer to his preliminary questions. It is indeed totally unclear how arguments 
related to the role of sporting federations or the specific features of sport could deter the 
finding that the disproportionate Greek rule infringes EC law. Second, experiences from the 
past, where „incursions from Europe‟ have been heavily criticized by the sporting world and 
any statement on the specificities of sport or the role of sporting federations has been eagerly 
embraced to claim an autonomous status for sport, justify some form of caution. Third, the 
Court‟s vigilance is in line with the careful approach of the sport sector, and the role of the 
sporting federations in particular, by the European institutions in recent years. This is clearly 
illustrated by the Lisbon Treaty, where for the first time an admittedly limited legal basis for a 
European sports policy was inserted and, more importantly, the specific nature of sport was 
recognised only in relation to the Union‟s (future) sports policy.71A further example can be 
found in the Commission‟s 2007 White Paper on Sport.72 Whereas the Commission in its 
Helsinki Report on sport (1998) had advocated the European Sports Model and the pyramid 
structure of the organization of sport in Europe,
73
 it took a more pragmatic position in its 
White Paper observing that  
“In view of the diversity and complexities of European sport structures it considers, however, that it is 
unrealistic to try to define a unified model of organization of sport in Europe. Moreover, economic and 
social developments that are common to the majority of the Member States (increasing 
commercialisation, challenges to public spending, increasing numbers of participants and stagnation in 
the number of voluntary workers) have resulted in new challenges for the organization of sport in 
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Europe. The emergence of new stakeholders (participants outside the organized disciplines, 
professional sports clubs, etc.) is posing new questions as regards governance, democracy and 
representation of interests within the sport movement.”.74  
The key functions of sporting federations are still acknowledged but their role is not absolute. 
Even if the Court in MOTOE does not explicitly elaborate upon this, nothing in the judgment 
seems to contradict this pragmatic statement.  
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